The New York Times continues its slanted coverage of detainees in the War on Terror. Reporting on such things isn't a bad idea: the subject is legitimate, and if a government official did something wrong, he should be punished for it, whether he is a PFC or a major general.
That being said, this article is shoddy and dishonest even by NYT standards. The article conflates prisoner abuse in Iraq with detainee treatment in Guantanamo. I'll save you the trouble of skimming the thing several times like I did. First, there is no doubt that enemy prisoners have been abused in Iraq. (Incidently, the word "enemy" doesn't show up in the entire article.) Second, there is no doubt that the Guantanamo detainees are made uncomfortable before they are interrogated, as a way to break their wills.
But pooping on yourself or being exposed to cold temperatures isn't like having a lit cigarette stuck in your ear. The former actions are uncomfortable and possibly humiliating, but the latter is potentially debilitating. Misleading the illegal combatants in Cuba (who are not, not, not prisoners of war!) by telling them you are an FBI agent isn't even a crime; I question whether it's a sin, unless you think al Qaeda members have a "right to know" who is questioning them.
The article says, "The documents are the most recent in a series of disclosures that have increasingly contradicted the military's statements that harsh treatment of prisoners happened only in limited, isolated cases." Not really — the Pentagon they're investigating the abuse claims. These new documents don't say much about the frequency or degree of abuse.
As I've said numerous times, the legal, just, and prudent thing to with unlawful combatants is to interrogate them, then execute them swiftly as an example to others. Bearing arms against a legitimate authority without wearing a uniform, not answering to a chain of command, and committing atrocities against civilians are each enough to place one outside Geneva protections. Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and the insurgents in Iraq should have been punished for making private wars (a duellum, in classic Just War terminology) against legitimate authority.
I don't say that because I have lost my love for human life. Quite the opposite: I love life so much that I want to see it defended with the maximum amount of vigor. Nothing but death will deter those who have descended below the level of beasts, and even then the threat of death may not be enough to stop them.
Question: do liberals have to bow several times a day in the direction of New York Times headquarters? Is that a requirement, or just a practice they encourage?
Also: why does the NYT pedantically put periods in "F.B.I." and "D.O.D.," even when quoting written documents that almost certainly didn't have periods within the acronyms?
And finally: The New York Times offers a summation of its case against the Iraq War, including "the torture of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the death of civilians in American attacks, the arrest of Sunni clerics, the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the illegality of the U.S. invasion."
Whoops, sorry: that was a Iraqi Sunni preacher encouraging the terrorist thugs and murderers who bomb Muslim schoolkids and assassinate election workers. My bad — it's hard to tell the difference.
Eric,
It remains apparent to me that the practices described at Gitmo are, from a moral standpoint, very wrong - indeed, are, basically, torture. What disturbs me about some commentaries I've seen on NRO in recent weeks is that they flat-out apologize for the practices, based on pure utilitarianism. I don't think you're doing that, but I'm not sure that the fact that the Gitmo practices aren't as bad as the Abu Ghraib ones is the most important fact about the situation. (I don't consider my point part of a case against the war - it's simply a case against unjust practices within war, against violations of jus in bello.)
(As for telling prisoners one is an FBI agent when one isn't - that's a flat-out lie, not merely a withholding of information, and a flat-out lie is immoral whether or not the person to whom it's told has a "right to know" the truth. See the Catechism as revised in 1997 in accordance with the editio typica, which faithfully reflects the view of Augustine and Aquinas.)
I don't know that I've seen anything on NRO that justifies torture recently, except perhaps Michael Ledeen's regret that Hitler wasn't shot during World War I when he was wounded. Ramesh Ponnuru digressed, saying that it's impermissible to do evil even in the service of good.
I will say flatly that I don't think exposing a Middle Easterner to hot temperatures is torture. Neither is exposing them to cold weather when they voluntarily lived in the highlands of Afghanistan. Torture is necessarily a matter of degree: it's not making someone merely uncomfortable, it's causing them severe mental or physical anguish. Whether or not there were abuses, I don't know; it would surprise me if there weren't, given the nasty character of the detainees and the provocations they probably offer. (That's not an excuse, it's an explanation.)
The NYT's unstated point, however, is not that there were unfortunate abuses at Guantanamo that should be remedied and/or punished, but that 1) detaining the poor unfortunate souls was wrong in the first place; and 2) the hearts of Bush, Rumsfeld, and the Evil Jew Neocons are black as soot.
Pope Pius XII ordered consecrated religious to hide Jews from the Nazis, and to do everything in their power (including the use of deception) to keep them from being captured and sent to concentration camps. I presume that deceiving murderers about the whereabouts of their intended victims isn't condemned by the Catechism, either explicitly or implicitly.
Pope Pius XII ordered consecrated religious to hide Jews from the Nazis, and to do everything in their power (including the use of deception) to keep them from being captured and sent to concentration camps. I presume that deceiving murderers about the whereabouts of their intended victims isn't condemned by the Catechism, either explicitly or implicitly.
Even if flat out lying to Nazis about the whereabouts of Jews weren't even venial matter, it is in no way analogous to the situation you doubted was sinful (i.e., interrogators lying about who they were). In the former case, refusing to divulge the information just wouldn't do: the Nazis had the power to search the house, arrest the person refusing to talk and his family, and even torture them. In the latter case, the situation is reversed. It is the person (i.e., the interrogator) not wishing to give the information the other party has no right to that has all the power; he can simply refuse to identify himself and there is nothing the interrogatee can do to make him talk or to harm him. A flat-out lie is clearly a sin in that case; Kevin would know better whether it is venial or grave.
Eric,
I just can't agree that torture is SUCH a matter of degree that leaving someone chained to the floor to soil himself in a hot or cold room isn't "torture." At some point, we've defined it away.
Vatican II's Gaudium et Spes (later quoted by John Paul II in the section of Veritatis Splendor on intrinsically evil acts) speaks of "torments inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itself," which is rather (and deliberately, I think) broad. Similarly, the Catechism speaks of "Torture which uses physical or moral violence" - it doesn't say the "violence" has to be severe, and it even explicitly includes violence other than just "physical" in its definition.
Regarding stuff on NRO since Ledeen - see the two subsequent articles I link and comment on at http://www.exceptionalmarriages.com/weblog/BlogDetail.asp?ID=20065 and http://www.exceptionalmarriages.com/weblog/BlogDetail.asp?ID=20257. Ponnuru is right, but his position is not the majority one among the writers NRO has been publishing on the subject.
Oh - and I would say that flat-out lying to a Nazi about the whereabouts of Jews is venially sinful (note, again that "lying" goes beyond "deception" - and cf. Aquinas's treatment of the Hebrew midwives' lie in Exodus as venially sinful). I don't know what kind of lie the "FBI agents" told, but I'd say it's (objectively) venially sinful at minimum.
NRO doesn't speak for me, so I'm not sure why we're talking about them in the first place. I do generally agree with their perspective, but I categorically reject utilitarianism, if that's what they're selling.
In order to condemn the "torture" at Guantanamo, you have to know a few things:
1. Are the events reported in those FBI memos true? (The FBI has its own institutional axe to grind, particularly against the CIA and DOD.)
2. Were the actions authorized by a competent authority? (That doesn't make it less wrong, but it does limit complicity to the people who are involved.)
3. If the memos are accurate, do all of the actions rise to the level of torture? I think we've had this discussion ad nauseum on Mark Shea's blog -- the degree of pain does matter, unless you're asserting that *any* discomfort is torture.
1. Yes, one does have to know whether the allegations are true. A number of folks, though (see NRO), want to argue that even if they're true, the alleged actions are not problematic. And I think your attempt to distinguish between the alleged actions and torture properly so-called borders on that.
2. I agree fully.
3. Well, again, the Church - Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution; John Paul II's Veritatis Splendor; the Catechism - defines torture pretty broadly, and generally rules out coercion (as distinguished from punishment for crimes committed). I understand that some Catholics want to argue with that, but I don't think we're at liberty to do so - the teaching is authoritative (and, for my part, it makes sense from the perspectives of both faith and reason). And, again, in any case, the behavior described in the allegation sounds rather bad, even though not the worst one could imagine. So even if you want to argue that some forms of discomfort-coercion aren't torture, I think it's especially dangerous to try to argue that the alleged acts aren't.
Like I said, I've been through this already on Mark's blog, and it's become tiresome. (I don't find you tiresome, Kevin, just the subject in general.) Asking for a definition of torture is neither an attempt to justify it, nor is it disingenuous. It doesn't "border" on anything.
It's safe to say that compared to many churchmen, I would set the pain threshold significantly higher for acts that are called "torture." Pain itself is only painful if it's above what you're used to -- so if these evil men are accustomed to severe hardships, chances are they will not feel temperature changes to be torture.
Coercion isn't ruled out by the Catechism or the teachings of the Church. The state has the right and duty to confiscate property, take lives, incarcerate its citizens, and many other unpleasant things.
What jury was it, exactly, which tried and found the POWs at Gitmo guilty of being illegal enemy combatants?
Our rights are -inalienable- coming from our Creator. He is the creator of the Arabs and Iraqis as well. They have the same unalienable rights.
Even breaking someones will like that is WRONG. Very sinful.
Honorable soldiers in just wars do not commit such attrocities, they refuse to obey illegal orders. Period.
POWs should be treated according to the Geneva Conventions. Period. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have fought them, or taken them prisoner. But it does mean that we don't treat them in a way that is utterly opposed to our most basic beliefs as Americans and Christians. We had a chance to show these people good things about America, and instead we showed ourselves to be no better than the Shah or the House of Saud. Why -wouldn't- they want to fight us after their experience of, yes, torture.
As to 1. I have seen on TV the prisoners being held in conditions in violation of the Geneva Convention.
Eric, at least one prisoner -died from hypothermia- that is way beyond 'temperature changes' I suppose you'd say St. Maximillian von Kolbe was on a diet??
These POWs are accused, not found guilty. They are deliberatly being held in an area that has the legal fiction of not being American territory so that they can be denied their unalienable rights. This is inexcusable. I'd vote for Bush over Kerry any day, but this greivous war crime needs to be punished to the full extent of the law - for the sake of America. Any American, including those in Gitmo, can be declared an "enemy combatant" non-person with the stroke of a Presidential pen. This, too is tyranny, and must be over-turned. And what the POWs in Gitmo are getting will be what Christians who refuse to support abortion and homoseuxality will get in the future.
Eric, the Fathers of Vatican II, the pope, and the Catechism authors aren't just "many churchmen." And I've already pointed out the distinction between coercion and punishment of those who've already been found guilty of a crime - your mention of the permissibility of the later only begs the question concerning the former.
... Furthermore, you're not just "asking" for a definition - you're proposing one - one that, I maintain, is deeply problematic, for reasons that do "border" on the reasons that the NRO pieces I cited are deeply problematic.
Puzzled, you're a regular reader. In fact, you probably read the post on which this comment thread is based, in which I said:
"Bearing arms against a legitimate authority without wearing a uniform, not answering to a chain of command, and committing atrocities against civilians are each enough to place one outside Geneva protections. Al Qaeda members in Afghanistan and the insurgents in Iraq should have been punished for making private wars (a duellum, in classic Just War terminology) against legitimate authority."
These aren't "war crimes," no matter what you read. The detainees in Cuba are entitled to their human rights. They have no rights as prisoner of war. That isn't a matter of opinion. It's a matter of International law:
"A reminder that The Hague Regulation concerning the laws and customs of war on land (article 1), confirmed by article 4 of the Third Convention, does not confer recognition of the status of prisoner of war to combatants not forming part of the "regular" army unless they fulfil the following conditions: a) being headed by a person responsible for his subordinates, b) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, c) carrying arms openly and d) conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."
See the second note at the bottom of the page: http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList104/046E2225AA0CE99DC1256B6600595193
I'm thoroughly sick of saying this over and over, so please refer back to this the next time the topic comes up:
Illegal combatants aren't entitled to Geneva protections. Illegal combatants aren't entitled to Geneva protections. Illegal combatants aren't entitled to Geneva protections. Illegal combatants aren't entitled to Geneva protections. Illegal combatants aren't entitled to Geneva protections.
And I'm not going to let you repeat the claims of the hysterical left, not here, not without comment. The ability of the president to designate persons as enemies of the U.S. isn't new. It's a well-established principle of constitutional law which was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in the Hamza case (though from the media reports you'd never know that.) The Court thought the detainees should receive military tribunals, not regular U.S. trials, if they were not prisoners of war. The administration proceeded to set up those tribunals, and they're going on right now.
Not only does the president have the right (and I'd say the duty) to designate American citizens as enemy combatants, he can do it even if they're on U.S. soil and bearing arms against the government. That happened during WWII, when German-American saboteurs caught in America with German nationals were caught, brought before a military tribunal, and executed.
You may have also heard of a little-known episode in American history known as the "Civil War," in which tens of thousands of Confederate prisoners were held in Federal prison camps. They were American citizens bearing arms against the government, and designated as prisoners by the authority of the President of the United States. Given the sanitary standards of the day, I bet some of the Confederates may have gotten sick and pooped in their pants, too.
I hadn't heard about the prisoner who died of hypothermia. Had we executed him, he would have died from a nice, clean, quick series of bullet wounds instead, so if your story is true, it's a shame we didn't punish him according to his crimes.
Kevin, the Fathers of Vatican II are mostly dead, so they've had little to say about the War on Terror, which is what I was talking about when I referred to the statements of churchmen (I'm thinking of people like Cardinal Martino). "Deeply problematic" isn't equivalent to "wrong," unless you're so "nuanced." Go ahead and tell me I'm wrong if you think I'm wrong. I can take it.
Eric, first, when the Church teaches something is intrinsically evil, it doesn't matter that those (e.g. the Council Fathers) who articulated the teaching are dead and that circumstances have changed. That's the whole point of teaching that something is intrinsically evil. And besides, the pope, who reechoed that teaching in Veritatis Splendor and who promulgated the Catechism, is not dead.
And, okay, yes, I think you're wrong, and more and more obviously and alarmingly so as this conversation goes on.
As I have no desire to pose as morally superior and I do feel for those in the military who must actually deal with these real life enemies, I do wonder why certain Catholics who like to assure the world they are more anti-torture than the next guy, can't give a definition of torture.
I've asked some of those types before, and the response is that S.F. doesn't really care, so we won't give him an answer. I know how international law defines torture. Does anyone know how the Church defines torture?
S.F.,
Kevin Miller quotes the Church's intentionally rather broad definition of torture earlier in this thread.
Here we go again. Good to see you, S.F. -- have you got a case of deja vu, too?
Kevin, you're demonstrating why it's so hard to talk about this subject. Let me be even more clear:
I am not in favor of torture.
I accept that the Church condemns torture, and I believe all that she teaches on that and every other subject touching on faith and morals.
The Church does not have a detailed definition of torture, so presumably we have to take the general teaching and apply it to specific circumstances.
I am in favor of applying coercive means to force illegal combatants to divulge information that will harm their fellow murderous criminals and their networks.
I am not in favor of applying those means to prisoners of war, who are protected from such things.
What about these statements alarms you?
The Poster,
You are wrong. Saying that torture uses physical or moral violence is not a definition. Cops using physical violence to apprehend suspects. Not torture. Sometimes parents even have to use physical violence against a child. Not torture.
For those who are oh-so-much-more-interested-in-the-truth-than-the-rest-of-us, you think you'd be a little less loose with the facts. If the Church has a definition of torture, give it to me, because I really do want to evaluate American troops' conducts by that standard. If you it hasn't, don't make stuff up.
Eric: What alarms me is that when you say that the practices described in that WP article I quoted aren't torture, it seems obvious to me that you're, for whatever reason, failing to take seriously the "intentionally broad" definition given in GS, VS, and the CCC.
... And, SF: Note again that the distinction between torture and, say, punishment has already been made. You're wrong that we don't have a definition here.
Kevin,
I'm not wrong. So far on this thread, no definition has been offered.
I'm willing to admit that the Church has a definition of torture somewhere that is different than the international law definition of torture. But you have yet to provide it. I am not persuaded (noth that you've tried) that CCC#2297 defines "torture." It does not pretend to.
See here for international law. Part I, Article I:
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h2catoc.htm
If you have the time, could you please link to the Church's definition of torture. If you do think CCC#2297, could you give us a clue how to apply that "definition?" In others, examples of torture versus not torture. I'm willing to provide examples, and read your evaulation, if necessary.
Keven, as I said in my original post, sticking a lit cigarette in someone's ear is torture. Exposing someone to hot weather, when he's from a hot part of the world, might be uncomfortable, but it isn't torture. I'm trying to discern what is and isn't torture, not say that everything done at Guantanamo is acceptable.
S.F.,
Have you ever heard of "don't shoot the messenger" (or in this case, the messenger's messenger as I was just pointing you to what Kevin said)?
If you don't like what the Church has to say, then just say so. But don't pretend that it hasn't said anything (or if Kevin is taking the Gaudium et Spes quotes out of context, argue on those grounds and provide evidence).
How's this for a definition of torture?
". . . the term "torture" means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions."
It's from Article 1 of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984.
http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html
This Convention has been acceded to by the Holy See in 2002.
http://www.holyseemission.org/26jun2002.html
Note that the convention is not only against torture, but also against "cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment".
And it says
"2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political in stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture."
Finally,
Here's a bit of evidence that JPII endorses the Geneva Conventions guidelines about torture:
http://www.dailycatholic.org/issue/2001Jan/jan15nr1.htm
"Israelis and Palestinians can only think of their future together, and each party must respect the rights and traditions of the other. It is time to return to the principles of international legality: the banning of the acquisition of territory by force, the right of peoples to self-determination, respect for the resolutions of the United Nations organization and the Geneva Conventions, to quote only the most important. Otherwise, anything can happen: from unilateral rash initiatives to an extension of violence that will be difficult to control."
The relevant Geneva Convention is at this address:
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm
It says:
"No physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind."
David,
Thank you. The Convention is what I linked to earlier. That is the international law definition of torture. I was not aware that the Holy See had singed onto this Convention. That would apparently mean that the Holy See accepts the Convention's definition of torture.
The Poster,
I kindly ask that you revoke your comments questioning my fidelity to the Church. It's uncharitable, unfair, and won't win you an argument.
Or how about this?
"5. In his message of November 30, 1998, John Paul II paid explicit homage to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights when he described it as "one of the most valuable and significant documents in the history of law".8 The rights articulated in the Declaration constitute an integrated whole with the affirmation of the dignity of every person as its common basis. The curtailment of any right violates a person's humanity. John Paul II has also stated—and this is a warning of great importance—that the selective use of the principles of the Declaration threatens "the organic structure of the Declaration which associates each right with other rights, duties and limits necessary for a just social order".9"
I suppose the relevant part of the Declaration is:
"Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
http://tinyurl.com/3ugpn
Now do we really need to parse the meaning of cruel, inhuman, and degrading?
I assume there is treatment milder than torture that falls under these headings. It's prohibited too.
Notice that neither the Declaration nor JPII nor the Pontifical Council for the Family treats people's rights to be free of such treatment as dependent upon their legal status. These are human rights.
Nor does it provide an exemption clause for cruel, inhuman, degrading, or tortuous treatment for some good end (gaining information that will save lives).
David,
It's great we all agree. However, I'm unsure why you stress that since no one here is arguing that torture, cruely, inhumanness, or degrading conduct is morally acceptable.
Now that we seem to be saying that the Vatican accepts the international law definition of torture, we can better evaulate actions that some call torture.
Yeah, and the UN says Zionism is racism too. What of it?
Further, there's two loopholes big enough to drive a truck through.
First of all, as Eric has said, the Geneva Conventions do not apply to illegal combatants and the link provided (http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html) even says "Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War" -- a completely separate animal.
Second of all, the last sentence of the U.N. definition gives the game away. All you would need to be in compliance, as Alan Dershowitz has noted, is have a duly-established magistrate who issues torture warrants -- voila, "legal sanctions." Or even "punishment."
And finally torture cannot be intrinsically evil, because the Church ordered it committed -- officially, repeatedly and under defined circumstrances throughout the Middle Ages. Further (and stipulating that Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo are "torture"), such a teching would make an utter mess of Church teaching on war because, granted the stipulation, no war has ever been fought justly (everybody not ignorant of history knows this). Jus in bello is unprecedented. So "war" itself probably becomes an intrinsic evil -- a very curious moral fact in that it never would have been noted by the Church, and sometimes even explicitly contradicted.
Or this, from JPII's 1999 Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in America:
"19. Among the positive aspects of America today, we see in civil society a growing support throughout the continent for democratic political systems and the gradual retreat of dictatorial regimes; this has immediate moral implications. The Church looks sympathetically upon this evolution insofar as it favors an ever more marked respect for the rights of each individual, including those accused and condemned, against whom it is never legitimate to resort to modes of detention and investigation — one thinks especially of torture — which are offensive to human dignity."
http://tinyurl.com/6ce8p
Victor,
I think I prefer JPII's judgement here:
"80. Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature "incapable of being ordered" to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are the acts which, in the Church's moral tradition, have been termed "intrinsically evil" (intrinsece malum): they are such always and per se, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances. Consequently, without in the least denying the influence on morality exercised by circumstances and especially by intentions, the Church teaches that "there exist acts which per se and in themselves, independently of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object".131 The Second Vatican Council itself, in discussing the respect due to the human person, gives a number of examples of such acts: "Whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide; whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat labourers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons: all these and the like are a disgrace, and so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice, and they are a negation of the honour due to the Creator".132"
http://tinyurl.com/4ynv6
David:
The problem is that it is one thing to say in a morally exhortatory sense "modes of detention and investigation ... which are offensive to human dignity." But citing that phrase legalistically as some sort of moral proof-text is just inviting chaos. It's becoming morally harder to justify legal punishment in this day and age, and using language like that is worse than not helpful.
Yes, we *do* have to parse "cruel," "inhuman" and "degrading." And "human dignity." There is no consensus on what these terms mean, not in THIS day and age (if there ever was). Given what passes at the least the first bar (prima facie case) before the magistrates of this day and age, granting those words any legal status is foolhardy at best.
Yes, I'm aware of the passage, David.
Now address my actual argument -- that this is impossible to square with OTHER Church orders (look up Ad Extirpada -- may be getting the spelling wrong) and with the teaching of the Church on the potential permissibility of war.
Fundamentalist proof-texting doesn't cut it.
Two points:
A pope may be mistaken in his prudential decisions. I think John Paul II probably thinks that Innocent IV was wrong about torturing heretics (which is the prudential decision involved in that bull) and about torturing people generally. I think the bishops at Vatican II agree.
The fact that a war may be just ad bellum doesn't justify every action that's taken by the just side in that war. Even though atrocities, as a matter of fact, often are committed by soldiers on the just side (shooting prisoners of war, for example), that doesn't damage the doctrine of just war. Nor does it make it problematic for us to condemn acts of atrocity.
Why is it any different with acts of torture?
We should condemn both torture and atrocities, and uphold the doctrine of just war (jus ad bellum and jus in bello).
David is right, ladies and gents (and Victor). And my final summary in a nutshell: The Magisterium does NOT teach that physical/mental pain have to be "severe" to be torture. Hence its agreement that when torture is defined in terms of "severity," you also have to rule out related acts that might not be "severe." Eric's bald assertions to the contrary don't cut it. It's true that the purpose of an infliction of pain matters - as whether it's "praeter intentionem" in the course of an act of self-defense or an arrest, or part of an act of punishment, or a means to the end of "coercion" of testimony or the like. But the Church's teaching is clear for all who're willing to listen: In the latter case, it's "torture," and it's intrinsically evil, regardless of severity.
Dr. Miller:
I do not see anywhere in Veritatis Splendor or Gaudium et Spes an indication that mild discomfort is intrinsically evil. In fact, the word "torment," which GS uses, is by definition more than mild discomfort. Your suggestion that it is infallible Magisterial teaching that prisoners cannot even be moderately discomfited seems to me to be a blanket statement of rather shaky foundation. (By the way, anything the Church defines as intrinsically evil must be infallibly defined as such, else She would be erring in faith and morals.)
I am not taking issue with the claim of wrongness, but rather with your statement that this is an infallible teaching of apparently grave matter. That is a rather lofty claim which would have substantial impact on prior Church teaching. Would you care to elaborate on your reasoning? I'm curious.
A blessed Advent to you.
Where did Kevin use the word infallible or make any claim about infallibility?
Something can be authoritative (a term Kevin did use) without being infallible.
Good question.
If something is intrinsically evil, that means that there are no circumstances in which it can ever be good, or excusable. It is always and everywhere wrong. For the Church to declare something intrinsically evil, She is not merely making a disciplinary call, but is binding the faithful to a certain course of moral action under penalty of sin. If She were wrong in Her judgment about something being intrinsically evil (i.e., there are some circumstances where it would be OK), then She would be misleading the faithful in a matter pertaining to their salvation. Therefore, it is commonly thought that the definition of something as intrinsically evil is an exercise of the ordinary universal Magisterium's infallibility. She cannot mislead the faithful in such matters. This is part of the reason why, for instance, canonizations are considered infallible - we can't have people proposed as models for faith who aren't actually in Heaven. That would be misleading.
So, saying "torture is wrong" is one thing. Saying "torture is intrinsically wrong" is another, and if we add minor discomfort to what we consider torture, then it seems that we have an infallible declaration by the Church that, say, turning the A/C up too high is wrong. That may indeed be the case, but I'd like to see the reasoning behind it, or at least some more thorough citations.
Well, including administering pain/discomfort in order to coerce prisoners in interrogation in those acts the Church deems intrinsically evil isn't Kevin's invention. That's included in the passage from Gaudium et Spes that John Paul II comments on:
"whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit;" (my emphasis)
I think JPII would say that it's also inconsistent with the Church's teaching to treat captives in a way that is manipulative/callous/coercive but not torture, strictly speaking torture.
Sorry. Botched that last sentence, which should read:
"I think JPII would say that it's also inconsistent with the Church's teaching to treat captives in a way that is manipulative/callous/coercive but not torture, strictly speaking."
I read "attempts to coerce the spirit" as a reference to forced religious conversions or perhaps the suppression of religious expression, as many other evils are listed there but the denial of religious freedom is not. If you read "attempts to coerce the spirit" too broadly, you would preclude incarceration for rehabilitative purposes.
I take it that incarceration for rehabilitative purposes doesn't fall under acts intended to violate the integrity of the human person.
I agree, David, but if you're attempting to rule all forms of coercion, no matter how mild, as morally wrong, then it seems to me that depriving someone of personal freedom in order to convert him to goodness is a significant act of "coercion."
To pick one of your words, you say that the use of "manipulation" is contrary to the Gospel: are you seriously suggesting that verbally tricking someone into revealing information about his criminal cohorts is sinful? By what logic? By what authority? It's all right to kill an aggressor, or you can put him in jail, or you can deprive him of his worldly goods, but verbal interrogation is wrong?
If that verbal trickery or interrogation involves lying, then yes, it's sinful.
That's not simply my view. It's the Catechism's:
"2482 "A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving."281 The Lord denounces lying as the work of the devil: "You are of your father the devil, . . . there is no truth in him. When he lies, he speaks according to his own nature, for he is a liar and the father of lies."282
2483 Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error. By injuring man's relation to truth and to his neighbor, a lie offends against the fundamental relation of man and of his word to the Lord.
2484 The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims. If a lie in itself only constitutes a venial sin, it becomes mortal when it does grave injury to the virtues of justice and charity.
2485 By its very nature, lying is to be condemned. It is a profanation of speech, whereas the purpose of speech is to communicate known truth to others. The deliberate intention of leading a neighbor into error by saying things contrary to the truth constitutes a failure in justice and charity. The culpability is greater when the intention of deceiving entails the risk of deadly consequences for those who are led astray.
2486 Since it violates the virtue of truthfulness, a lie does real violence to another. It affects his ability to know, which is a condition of every judgment and decision. It contains the seed of discord and all consequent evils. Lying is destructive of society; it undermines trust among men and tears apart the fabric of social relationships."
http://tinyurl.com/6zudu
See also:
"St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin", The Thomist 61 (1997) 279-299.
Eric,
these strictures against lying or torture or harsh interrogation techniques are not easy for me to accept. I suppose most of us think in a consequentialist way about certain hard cases. I certainly do.
But I think we must think hard about how to get information from terrorists, unlawful combatants, and prisoners of war without violating them.
Apart from the narrower moral objections to using torture and other abusive coercive techniques, there is a series of legal problems that arise when such techniques are used.
See Phil Carter's series "Tainted by Torture", (all the more interesting because Carter himself is not opposed absolutely to the use of such techniques in extraordinary circumstances):
http://slate.msn.com/id/2100543
http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/posts/1102083583.shtml
Once again, I bring up the widespread, systematic attempt over several years throughout the Italian peninsula for the institutional Church to "deceive" the Nazi occupiers into thinking they were not concealing Jews. You're saying, David, that Pope Pius XII encouraged a massively sinful program among the faithful -- with the full complicity of the Vatican bureacracy and the religious orders?
Rubbish. I would say that one does not have the right to hear a fact if one is going to use that fact to injure or kill others. I would include military methods such as broadcasting false information about troop movements, and pretending that a unit is in one place when in reality it is in another, as licit examples of misleading others. The Catechism is normative and authoritative, but it is not comprehensive. I do not think the passages you cite truly address the examples I have given.
I can licitly refuse to divulge certain bits of information. If my refusal happens to cause, in part, someone else to form a false belief, that doesn't constitute my lying.
It also seems to me that I can do a certain thing (an act) which has a variety of plausible interpretations, some of which may be false interpretations, without lying.
Moving dummy tanks or armaments around in an area away from where my troops really are is one example.
From the Catechism: "To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error." The highlighted clause is crucial. It seems to me that if the object of an action is not to lead someone into error, but to save someone's life, then misleading someone is not lying. As Father Poumade pointed out, not every evil action is intrinsically evil -- you might not hack off someone's arm under most circumstances, but if the arm had gangrene and you were a surgeon, that wouldn't be an evil act.
You didn't refute my point about the campaign to save the Jews in Italy. These Catholics told untruths and forged documents, all at the behest of the pope. Was the Holy Father wrong to do that?
[Comment #50 for this thread! That's almost a record!]
Eric,
Can you direct me to some good historical materials on the Pius XII campaign? I'd need to know more before giving an opinion on it.
I think we need to be careful not to let directing our intention narrowly determine whether or not an action is licit. While you're inclined to treat actions such as lying or torture in this way, many on the Catholic theological left will use very similar reasoning to pronounce all sorts of acts (usually involving sexual matters) licit.